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“Thank God We’re Here”: Judicial
Exclusivity in Charter Interpretation
and Its Consequences
Grant A. Huscroft*

I hope we are not pushing too many problems that are too complex
into the courts. We are having thrust upon us many policy issues of
profound importance left unresolved by the other branches of
government. People in increasing numbers are coming to the courts for
the assertion of rights to political, economic, and social equality. The
courts cannot shy away from decision-making on controversial
questions. The judges have tenure and they must give some answer,
right or wrong; from the judicial system people expect, and get, in the
words of one observer, “enforced fairness”. It is presumably easier and
cheaper to look to the courts for social changes than to go through the
laborious and time-consuming process of persuading legislators.
Litigation is being substituted for politics; the judicial process for the
political process.1

I. INTRODUCTION
The concern underlying this quotation is a familiar one. It has been
raised with increasing frequency, as more and more issues have become
the subject of Charter litigation. It underlies the complaint of “judicial
activism” that is so often heard.
It comes as a surprise, then, to learn not only that the concern was
expressed by (then) Justice Dickson, but that it was expressed in 1983
— prior to the first wave of Charter litigation reaching the Supreme
*
Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. Thanks to Chris Cheung and Josh
Sidsworth for their research assistance and helpful comments. Thanks also to James Allan,
Rob Frater, Joanna Harrington, and Paul Rishworth, who commented on earlier drafts.
1
Dickson, “The Public Responsibilities of Lawyers” (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 175, at 187
[internal footnote omitted].

Supreme Court Law Review

242

(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Court of Canada. Whatever he may have thought then,2 any diffidence
he had about the role of the Court soon gave way to confidence, not
only in the Court’s ability to resolve complex issues of profound importance but in its legitimacy in doing so. Dickson’s legacy is his Charter
jurisprudence, which embraced the Charter and the possibilities it presented, and established the Court as the “guardian of the constitution.”3
Has judicial review been substituted for the political process in the
Charter era? How are we to judge? The debate over judicial activism
cannot be won or lost on the basis of statistical analysis. It might be
asked whether it is a debate worth having at all. After all, once it is
acknowledged that it is the Court’s responsibility to redress violations of
the Charter, it follows that the Court must strike down legislation at
least some of the time. If it does so having interpreted the Charter correctly, then complaints that it does so too often are really beside the
point. On the other hand, if the Court interprets the Charter incorrectly,
then decisions striking down legislation are properly criticized on this
basis, whether they be many or few.4
This is not a satisfactory answer to the debate over judicial activism,
however, because the premises are problematic. It is meaningless to
speak in terms of “correct” and “incorrect” Charter interpretation. Even

2

The quoted passage follows a lengthy discussion of the importance of the Charter
and the Court’s new responsibilities. On one hand, Dickson J. lamented the failure of the
Court under the Canadian Bill of Rights [S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III],
caused by concern about the legitimacy of judicial review. “That thinking and those misgivings are now behind us,” he wrote (at 185). He acknowledged how much about the Charter
“depends upon how it is interpreted” and, while urging “reasonable sense, restraint and selfcontrol,” emphasized the need for generosity in interpretation (at 186). On the other hand, in
the passage quoted above, he appeared to be concerned about the Court’s ability to deal with
complex policy issues that are being forced upon it, and about the wisdom of substituting
litigation for the political process.
3
Hunter v. Southam (sub nom. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v. Southam Inc.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 [hereinafter
“Hunter”].
4
Sujit Choudhry and Claire Hunter acknowledge that “a proper definition of the rate
of activism would be as follows: the percentage of cases that governments lose, less the
percentage of cases that governments should lose.” Nevertheless, they proceed to analyze
judicial activism on the basis that any second guessing of legislatures constitutes activism,
and conclude that “[t]he question should no longer be merely whether judicial activism is
good, but also whether judicial activism is real.” See “Measuring Judicial Activism on the
Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE” (2003)
48 McGill L.J. 525, at 533 and 557.
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if we assume, as Ronald Dworkin argues, that right answers exist,5 as
Jeremy Waldron has argued we have no way of determining what they
are; it will always be reasonable to disagree about the meaning of rights
and what they require in particular circumstances.6 Whether one thinks
that there is too much or too little judicial review depends ultimately
upon normative assumptions about the bounds of the political and legal
processes — what is properly a matter for the people, on one hand,
versus the courts on the other. Here too, reasonable disagreement is
inevitable.
Faced with these sorts of disagreements, the way in which the Supreme Court, Parliament, and the provincial legislatures perceive their
roles under the Charter is obviously of crucial importance. At the outset
of our second generation under the Charter, the Court’s role is clear: it
has claimed the role of “guardian of the constitution.” For their parts,
however, neither Parliament nor the provincial legislatures have asserted
any claim to authority where the Charter is concerned. On the contrary,
judicial exclusivity in Charter interpretation is a norm that has been
factored into political deliberations. Only a few years following Dickson
C.J.’s retirement his successor, Lamer C.J., took the offensive in responding to the charge of judicial activism by pointing this out:
Thank God we’re here. It’s not for me to criticize legislators but if
they choose not to legislate, that’s their doing. If they prefer to leave it
up to the court that’s their choice. But a problem is not going to go
away because legislators aren’t dealing with it. People say we’re
activist, but we’re doing our job.7

5

Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), at 119.
Reasonable disagreement about rights is a recurring theme in Waldron’s work. See
Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 10-17 and 221-31. As
Waldron says in “Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators” in Brodie &
Huscroft (eds.), Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2004) at 11-12:
The assumption of disagreement has nothing to do with moral relativism or noncognitivism. It is perfectly compatible with there being a truth of the matter about
rights and the principles of constitutionalism — only, it assumes that our condition is
not one in which the truth of the matter discloses itself in ways that are not reasonably
deniable.
7
Tibbetts, “Politicians Duck Divisive Issues, Chief Justice says” The National Post
(12 July 1999) A1.
6
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These comments confirm that judicial review has been substituted
for the political process. According to Lamer C.J., however, responsibility for the substitution lies with politicians rather than the Court. Canadians are fortunate, in his view, to have a court willing to do its job
when politicians cannot be counted upon to do theirs.
Political inertia on rights-based issues is a problem in my view, but
the Court is as much part of the problem as the solution. The pending
reference to the Supreme Court on same-sex marriage provides a clear
demonstration of the problem. It also provides an important opportunity
for the Court to consider the importance of institutional roles where the
Charter is concerned, and the debilitating effect judicial exclusivity in
Charter interpretation can have on the political process.

II. ESTABLISHING THE COURT’S INTERPRETIVE MONOPOLY
The focus of constitutional law in the Charter era is undoubtedly the
Supreme Court. Its decisions are studied not only to determine the current state of the law but to attempt to predict its future trajectory. Will
the Court announce new analogous grounds of discrimination under
section 15(1)? Will it expand the concept of fundamental justice under
section 7, or broaden the scope of the right with new interpretations of
life, liberty, or security of the person? Preoccupation with these sorts of
questions is a natural consequence of the Court’s commitment to progressive interpretation. Concern with future appointments to the Court is
another such consequence. With so much at stake, the composition of
the Court matters more than ever before.8
There seems little support for the idea that the legislative branch of
government has a role to play in interpreting the Charter. The question
“whether legislatures are suited to interpreting the rights of minorities
and the accused and long term fundamental values”9 is asked rhetorically. Why is this so?
8
At time of writing, two appointments to the Court were pending, and speculation
about who might be appointed was common, not only amongst lawyers but the public as well.
See Makin, “All bets off in top-court race” The Globe and Mail (3 May 2004) A5, establishing odds on a number of oft-discussed appointment possibilities.
9
In Roach’s view, “[t]he track record of legislatures on Charter issues is not strong.”
Roach, “Dialogic Review and its Critics” in Constitutionalism in the Charter Era, supra, note
6, at 53.
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1. Asserting the Need for Judicial Interpretation
The starting point is the widely held assumption that legislatures are
the enemy of rights. It follows that they cannot be allowed to determine
the answers to rights-based questions. As well, it is usually assumed that
rights analysis is beyond their ken. Kent Roach sums up these points as
follows: “[t]he dangers are not only that legislatures will gang up on the
unpopular and act as a judge in their own majoritarian causes, but also
that they will avoid or finesse issues of principle.”10 This is the old “tyranny of the majority” argument along with an appeal to the nemo iudex
in sua causa principle, casually made as though there is no rejoinder.11
So great is the rhetorical force of this argument that it causes the deficiencies in judicial review to be overlooked or even ignored. It is considered better for the Court to decide Charter questions, even at the cost
of erroneous decisions from time to time, than to risk the spectre of
majoritarian excess.

10

Id.
Jeremy Waldron provides the rejoinder in Law and Disagreement, supra, note 6, at
296-301. Critiquing Dworkin’s argument in Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Waldron says:
Unless we envisage a literally endless chain of appeals, there will always be some
person or institution whose decision is final. And of that person or institution, we can
always say that since it has the last word, its members are ipso facto ruling on the acceptability of their own view. Facile invocations of nemo iudex in sua causa are no
excuse for forgetting the elementary logic of authority: people disagree and there is a
need for a final decision and a final decision-procedure [at 297].…
Sometimes we talk carelessly as though there were a special problem for the legitimacy of popular majority decision-making, a problem that does not exist for other
forms of political organization such as aristocracy or judicial rule. Because the phrase
“tyranny of the majority” trips so easily off the tongue, we tend to forget about other
forms of tyranny; we tend to forget that legitimacy is an issue that pertains to all political authority. Indeed it would be very odd if there were a graver problem of legitimacy for popular majoritarian decision-making. Other political systems have all the
legitimacy-related dangers of popular majoritarianism: they may get things wrong;
they may have an unjust impact on particular individuals or groups; in short, they may
act tyrannically. But they have in addition one legitimacy-related defect that popular
majoritarianism does not have: they do not allow a voice and a vote in a final decisionmaking procedure to every citizen of the society; instead they proceed to make final
decisions about the rights of millions on the basis of the voices and votes of a few [at
299].
11
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2. Asserting Judicial Review’s Democratic Credentials
It is an “ineluctable reality” Alexander Bickel wrote, that judicial
review is a counter-majoritarian force: “when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here
and now … [J]udicial review is a deviant institution in the American
democracy.”12
The counter-majoritarian objection to judicial review continues to
animate American thinking about the topic, even two centuries after the
United States Supreme Court asserted its constitutional authority in
Marbury v. Madison.13 Whatever might be said about the origins of
judicial review under the U.S. Bill of Rights, however, the Charter specifically empowers courts to strike down legislation. It is supposed to be
a counter-majoritarian instrument14 and, what is more, it was enacted
pursuant to democratic processes. Far from being a deviant institution in
Canadian democracy, judicial review is said to have a democratic pedigree.15 As Justice Bertha Wilson put it:
What right have [judges] to frustrate the will of the people’s duly
elected representatives? None, I would say, except for the fact that in

12
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), at 16-18. The extraordinary nature of
judicial review is a common feature of American scholarship. As Fred Schauer has observed,
Americans regard judicial review as legitimate on the understanding that it is “an exceptional
event,” and the Court’s power is to be exercised “only with the greatest reluctance” (Schauer,
“Ashwander Revisited” (1995) Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, at 71).
13
5 U.S. 137 (1803). Numerous articles were written on the two-hundredth anniversary of Marbury v. Madison. The Wake Forest Law Review devoted its Summer 2003 issue
to the case.
14
Jeremy Waldron points out that the term counter-majoritarian is misleading, since it
overlooks the fact that courts, like legislatures, operate on the basis of a bare majority vote.
See “Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators,” supra, note 6, at 27.
15
Jeremy Waldron objects to the suggestion that judicial review is democratic because
it was the result of democratic process:
[I]f the people want a regime of constitutional rights, then that is what they
should have: democracy requires that. But we must not confuse the reason for carrying
out a proposal with the character of the proposal itself. If the people wanted to experiment with a dictatorship, principles of democracy might give us a reason to allow
them to do so. But it would not follow that dictatorship is democratic.
“A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights” (1993) O.J.L.S. 18, at 46.
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enacting the Charter these same duly elected representatives conferred
not just that right but that duty upon them.16

In addition to emphasizing the democratic nature of the Court’s
mandate, Supreme Court Justices have usually sought to downplay their
powers, or professed a lack of interest in them. Chief Justice Dickson
emphasized the Court’s role as dutiful servant, describing the Charter as
something the judges “did not ask for,” but had “thrust upon us.”17 According to McLachlin C.J., “[t]here is no evidence that judges, individually or collectively, particularly wanted the Charter.”18
3. The Impact of Living Tree Constitutionalism
Living tree constitutionalism — the idea that the Canadian Constitution is “capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”19 —
emphasizes the importance of the interpreted Charter, and in particular
Ronald Dworkin’s conception of judicial review. Dworkin suggested in
Law’s Empire that the task of interpreting constitutions is like the writing of a chain novel, each judge adding to the constitutional story with
his or her interpretations of the text. Judges are constrained by the “dimension of fit,” according to Dworkin, and must choose from amongst

16
Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” in Howe & Russell (eds.), Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 73, at 75. The argument from the Charter’s democratic origin is sometimes invoked by politicians to tout the
democratic credentials of Charter decisions they support. Following the government’s decision not to appeal the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney
General) (sub nom. Halpern v. Toronto (City); Halpern v. Ontario) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161,
225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (C.A.), establishing same-sex marriage, then-Justice Minister Martin
Cauchon stated: “Let us remember that the Charter was not put in place by the judiciary. Its
adoption in 1982 was a political decision following a heated debate in Parliament.” Campbell
Clark, Jane Taber & Tu Thanh Ha, “Chrétien Prepares Pivotal Speech” The Globe and Mail
(19 August 2003) A1.
17
Quoted in Sharpe & Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2003), at 380. Justice Bertha Wilson makes the same point in an article
aptly titled “We Didn’t Volunteer,” supra, note 16.
18
McLachlin, “Courts, Legislatures and Executives in the Post-Charter Era” in Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, supra, note 16, 63, at 68.
19
Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 136, per Lord Sankey
(P.C.).
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the possible interpretations the one that “makes the work in progress
best, all things considered.”20
The obvious complaint about this conception of judicial review is
that it begs the question as to the proper role of a judge engaged in constitutional adjudication.21 In Richard Posner’s view, Dworkin’s chain
novel analogy fails because it gives judges too much power:
[D]ecisions interpreting an authoritative legal text … inherently stand
on a different, and lower level than the text. Only the text is fully
authentic; all the interpretive decisions must return Antaeus-like to the
text for life-giving strength. Dworkin’s analogy equates the judges
who interpret the Constitution to the framers of the Constitution.22

This is a powerful criticism in the United States but in Canada it is
not. Dworkin’s chain novel analogy is an apt description of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s approach to Charter interpretation,23 which emphasizes the importance of progressive interpretation of the Charter over the
text itself, along with the intentions of those who drafted it and their
understandings of it. The Court’s approach in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General)24 is typical. There, an ostensibly simple right — the
20
Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), at 228-38. Dworkin
discusses the moral reading theory of constitutional interpretation and the requirement of
“constitutional integrity” in Freedom’s Law, supra, note 11, at Ch. 1.
21
As Michael McConnell has written:
Why does [Dworkin] assign the role of “author” to the judge? In the context of
law making subject to constitutional judicial review, it seems more accurate to view
the various legislative, executive, and common law decision makers as the authors,
and to view judges as editors or referees. The judges’ task, it seems, is to ensure that
the author of each chapter conforms to the rules of chain novel writing, not to write the
books themselves.
McConnell, “The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of the Constitution” (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, at 1274.
22
Posner, Law and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed., 1998),
at 246. Posner adds that as Dworkin defines it, the chain novel
places no constraint on the authors of subsequent chapters. Each author can in the
first sentence of his chapter kill off all the existing characters and start anew. Of
course this would not be thought cricket, but that just means that the writing of a chain
novel is a more complex practice than Dworkin’s description of it. It is thus unclear to
what exactly he is analogizing the legal interpretive process [id.].
23
Justice Bertha Wilson has referred to Dworkin’s metaphor with approval in extrajudicial writing. See “The Making of a Constitution: Approaches to Judicial Interpretation”
[1988] P.L. 370, at 373. (“The Constitution is always unfinished and is always evolving.”)
24
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37.
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right to vote and to run for office (section 3) — was interpreted by the
majority of the Court as requiring “effective representation,”25 thus
rendering legislation governing political party status and privileges
unconstitutional. Justice Iacobucci acknowledged the narrowness of the
right but said that it was only narrow “[o]n its face,” adding that Charter
analysis “requires courts to look beyond the words of the section.”26 On
this approach, many chapters of the Charter story remain to be written
by the Court. Echoing Dworkin, McLachlin C.J. has described the Charter as “a work in progress.”27
4. Equating the Court’s Decisions with the Charter Itself
Once the need for judicial interpretation of the Charter, the democratic legitimacy of judicial review, and the Court’s interpretive discretion have been established, it seems natural to equate the Court’s
decisions interpreting the Charter with the Charter itself. This equation
is captured in former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hughes’ aphorism: “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is
what the judges say it is.”28
Ontario Chief Justice McMurtry has invoked Hughes in explaining
judicial review under the Charter,29 and Hughes is often cited by legal
scholars as well.30 Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell are forthright in

25
The concept of “effective representation” was first invoked in Reference re Electoral Boundaries Commission Act ss. 14, 20 (Saskatchewan) (sub nom. Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, to limit the scope of
the right to vote by not requiring parity of voting power across electoral boundaries.
26
Supra, note 24, at para. 19.
27
I criticize this conception in “A Constitutional Work in Progress? The Charter and
the Limits of Progressive Interpretation” in Constitutionalism in the Charter Era, supra, note
6, at 413.
28
Hughes, Speech before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907, in Addresses and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New York, 1906-1908 (New York:
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1908) 133, at 139. I am grateful to Richard Friedman of the University
of Michigan Faculty of Law for a discussion of Hughes and his famous remarks, and help
with the references here.
29
Speech by Chief Justice of Ontario, Roy McMurtry (August 26, 2003, Ontario Justice Education Network, University of Western Ontario).
30
Hughes’ quotation is used to explain interpretive discretion in Hogg, Constitutional
Law of Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997), at ch. 5.5(b). John Saywell’s
summation of the history of Canadian federalism echoes Hughes’ remarks: “[T]he law of the
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observing that “judges have a great deal of discretion in ‘interpreting’
the law of the constitution, and the process of interpretation inevitably
remakes the constitution into the likeness favoured by the judges.”31
Originalists find this anathema,32 of course, yet in Canada it appears to
be uncontroversial, as though it is the obvious consequence of the decision to adopt the Charter.
Hughes’ remark is not an accurate description of American constitutionalism. In fairness to Hughes, however, it wasn’t proffered as such.33
Nor was his remark even made while he was a judge. Hughes made the
remark in a speech he gave as a candidate for governor of New York,
well prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court.34 In response to
criticism of public service administration, Hughes is said to have abandoned his prepared text and made the following remarks:
I have the highest regard for the courts. My whole life has been spent
in work conditioned upon respect for the courts. I reckon him one of
the worst enemies of the community who will talk lightly of the
dignity of the bench. We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution
is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our
constitution is what the judicial lawmakers have said it is, and will be what they say it may
be.”: The Lawmakers (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 2002), at 309.
31
Hogg & Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (1997)
35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75, at 77.
32
Most prominently United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See Scalia,
A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 1997), at
41-47; Scalia, “The Bill of Rights: Confirmation of Extant Freedoms or Invitation to Judicial
Creation?” in Huscroft & Rishworth (eds.), Litigating Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002),
at 19; and Scalia, “Romancing the Constitution: Interpretation as Invention” in Constitutionalism in the Charter Era, supra, note 6.
33
Hughes’ biographers record that he was troubled by the use to which his remarks
were put:
Through the remainder of his life he was to hear and see this casual phrase, torn
from the context of an extemporaneous speech, repeated again and again as if he had,
in a moment of candor, exposed the solemn function of judging as a sort of humbuggery. Of course he had done nothing of the sort. “The inference that I was picturing
constitutional interpretation by the courts as a matter of judicial caprice,” he wrote in
his Biographical Notes, “ … was farthest from my thought…”
Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, Vol. I (New York: Macmillan Group, 1951), at 204.
34
Hughes served as governor of New York for two terms before being appointed an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1910. He resigned from the Court in 1916, ran for
President and lost, but returned to the Court in 1930 as Chief Justice.35 Hughes was speaking on the Public-Service Commissions bill, which was criticized by John Stanchfield, a
political opponent. Supra, note 28, at 133 and 139.
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liberty and of our property under the Constitution. I do not want to see
any direct assault upon the courts, nor do I want to see any indirect
assault upon the courts. And I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, no more
insidious assault could be made upon the independence and esteem of
the judiciary than to burden it with these questions of administration
— questions which lie close to the public impatience, and in regard to
which the people are going to insist on having administration by
officers directly accountable to them.
Let us keep the courts for the questions they were intended to consider
...35

Hughes was explaining, in other words, why it was appropriate to keep
matters of administration out of the courts. He considered that the courts
should not have to waste time on such matters when it had more important things to do.36
The U.S. Supreme Court has rarely asserted the power Hughes’
aphorism suggests.37 On the contrary, the view that constitutional interpretation is a shared enterprise is mainstream in the United States. Laurence Tribe makes this point rhetorically:
What if, for example, Congress enacted a law (over the President’s
veto) ordering the imprisonment or summary execution of a suspected
terrorist by name and a politicized Supreme Court upheld it? Shouldn’t
the President have the power — even the duty — to refuse to carry out
the sentence? Similarly, suppose that in the year 1863 the same
Supreme Court that decided Dred Scott ruled that the emancipation
proclamation was unconstitutional as a taking of property. Would
Lincoln have been obligated to return freed blacks to slavery? These
examples illustrate the gravity of the separate oath requirement that the
36

Hughes continued:
You must have administration, and you must have administration by administrative officers. … Under the proper maintenance of your system of government and in
view of the wide extension of regulating schemes which the future is destined to see,
you cannot afford to have that administration by your courts. Supra, note 28, at 141.
37
The paradigm exception is Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), in which the Court
pronounced that it was “supreme in the exposition” of the Constitution (at 18). See Tribe,
American Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2000), at 254-58, describing the
Court’s claim of constitutional supremacy as “quite understandable given the open state
resistance to the principles announced in Brown,” and noting that “subsequent assertions of
ultimate authority have tended to be more restrained” (at 255-56).
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Constitution imposes on the President … and the legitimacy of
differing interpretations of the Constitution itself.38

Thus, in regard to American law Hughes’ remark is more aptly described as a quip.39 Yet, it has considerable force as a description, and
for some a normative conception, of Canadian constitutionalism. Canadian governments have never had a Dred Scott40 or a Lochner41 moment
to deal with; they have not had to issue a direct challenge to the Court or
its decisions.42 Nor has there been anything like the willful disobedience
that followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.43 On the contrary, as we will see, Canadian governments
have built judicial exclusivity in interpreting the Charter into their political plans.

38

Tribe, id., at 266-67. See also Devins & Fisher, “Judicial Exclusivity and Political
Instability,” (1998) 84 Va. L. Rev. 83, and Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts (1999) 6-32. Cf. Alexander & Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation” (1997) 110 Harv L. Rev. 1359, and “Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply” (2000)
17 Const. Commentary 455; and Farber, “The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v.
Aaron Revisited” [1982] U. Ill. L. Rev. 387.
39
Cox, The Court and the Constitution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), at 68. Nevertheless, Alexander and Schauer specifically invoke Hughes in arguing that the Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution should be understood as equivalent in status to the Constitution itself:
We argued, to put it starkly, that “the Constitution is what the judges say it is”
may well be bad jurisprudence because it is incomprehensible as an attempt to explain
what it means to argue to the Supreme Court, but that it is nonetheless a desirable attitude for non-judicial officials to have towards the Court and its product, in much the
same way, but far less controversially, that it is a desirable attitude for lower court
judges to have towards the Court and its opinions.
“Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply,” id., at 455.
40
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
41
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42
Parliament’s action following the Court’s decision in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4
S.C.R. 411, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98 is an exception, but is not so momentous. Nevertheless, it is
criticized strongly by Cameron, “Dialogue and Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment on R. v. Mills” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 1051.
43
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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III. REINFORCING JUDICIAL EXCLUSIVITY: THE POPULARITY OF
THE COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
One of the key factors reinforcing the idea of judicial exclusivity in
interpreting the Charter is the popularity of the Court itself. Supreme
Court Justices are as respected and admired as politicians are distrusted
and scorned. They are treated as celebrities, and honoured as politicians
almost never are. Judges may not court popularity, but neither do they
appear to discourage it.44
It might be argued that the Court is well regarded because it deserves to be — that it is respected and admired for the way in which it
has exercised its duties under the Charter. There is much to this.45 But it
is also fair to say that popularity is a relative thing, and it is easy to be
popular compared to politicians. In comparison to politicians, judges are
treated almost reverentially by the media. Supreme Court Justices are
not subject to a public vetting process prior to their appointments, and
politicians are cautious about criticizing them once they are appointed,
lest they be seen as undermining the independence of the judiciary. A
44

It is not unusual for Justices to be honoured for their work, not only in Canada but
internationally. In 2003, the “Peter Gruber Foundation,” based in the U.S. Virgin Islands,
awarded retired Supreme Court Justice Bertha Wilson and current Ontario Court of Appeal
Justice Rosalie Abella its Justice Award for their work in human rights. According to the
Gruber Foundation website, the award comes with a gold medal and a $200,000 cash award.
See online: <http://www.petergruberfoundation.org/justice/justice_frameset.htm> (viewed
March 29, 2004).
The three members of the Ontario Court of Appeal whose decision in Halpern v.
Canada, supra, note 16, held the law of marriage unconstitutional were named “Nation
Builders of the Year” by The Globe and Mail. They were interviewed and profiled at length,
and posed for a full-page colour photo. See online: <http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/
story/RTGAM.20031212.wnat1212/BNStory/Front/> (viewed March 29, 2004). The awards
are discussed in the “Report of the Chief Justice of Ontario Upon the Opening of the Courts
of Ontario for 2004” online: <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/court_of_appeal/speeches/
opening_speeches/coareport2004.htm>.
45
It is common for Canadians to assume that the Supreme Court of Canada enjoys
greater respect than its American counterpart, which is assumed to more political in nature.
However, an Ipsos-Reid poll from 2001 found that even though 93 per cent said decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court are influenced by partisan politics, fully 64 per cent said they approved of the Court’s decisions over the past year (which included the controversial decision
in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)), while 85 per cent said that they have respect for Supreme Court Justices (45 per cent have a “great deal” of respect; 40 per cent have a “fair
amount” of respect). See Ipsos-Reid Press Release, “Supreme Decisions: Public’s view of the
Supreme Court” (5 July 2001).
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number of conventions operate to insulate the judiciary from the sorts of
criticism to which politicians are subjected routinely. This needn’t be so
— it is certainly not the case in the United States, for example — but it
is so. Despite the nature of the task they are performing in the Charter
era, Supreme Court Justices are presumed to be doing law rather than
politics, and have managed to remain above the political fray as a result.
I have no doubt that this will change in time. My point is simply that
the popularity of the Court, combined with the unpopularity of politicians, helps reinforce the idea of judicial exclusivity in interpreting the
Charter. Chief Justice McLachlin has explicitly linked the Court’s popularity to the widening scope of the tasks it is asked to fulfill. But while
she acknowledged it was a “radical alteration in the public perception of
the role of judges in modern society,”46 she did not deprecate it. On the
contrary, the public’s “increasing confidence in judges to sort out society’s problems” appears to be a matter of pride for the Chief Justice.47
The Chief Justice is right to say that the public has increasing confidence in the ability of judges to sort out society’s problems. But public
support is no proof of the legitimacy of judicial review or its democratic
46

Id.
McLachlin, “The Role of Judges in Modern Society” (Speech at the Fourth Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conference, 5 May 2001). Justice Rosalie Abella of the Ontario
Court of Appeal has also used public opinion polls to argue in support of judicial review:
We spent the last decade listening to a chorus moaning over the fate of a majority
whose legislatively endorsed wishes could theoretically be superceded by those of
judges, only to learn in poll after poll that an overwhelming majority of that majority
is happy, proud and grateful to live in a country that puts its views in perspective
rather than in cruise control; who prefers to see judicial rights protection as a reflection of judicial integrity or independence rather than of judicial trespass or activism;
and who understands that the plea for judicial deference may be nothing more than a
prescription for judicial rigor mortis.
“Public Opinion, the Courts, and Rights: The Charter in Context” in Magnet, Beaudoin, Gall & Manfredi (eds.), The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Reflections on
the Charter After Twenty Years (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2003) 421, at 434.
Justice Abella’s assertion that “poll after poll” demonstrates overwhelming majority
support is not supported by recent polls. An Angus Reid survey in 1999 found that while 50
per cent considered that judges do not have too much power, 45 per cent considered that they
do. See Makin, “Opinion mixed on power of judges” The Globe and Mail (23 November
1999). An Ipsos-Reid poll in 2003 showed that 54 per cent thought judges have too much
power, while 44 per cent considered that they do not (Ipsos-Reid Press Release, 10 August
2003). This survey also revealed that 71 per cent agreed that Parliament, rather than the
courts, should make law. Nevertheless, 78 per cent agreed that the courts had the right to
issue legally binding decisions under the Charter.
47
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credentials, just as public opposition is no proof of its illegitimacy or
democratic failings. The Court should not shrink from upholding the
Charter in the face of unpopularity, but nor should it infer an expanded
mandate from its popularity. There is more to the Constitution than
judicial review.

IV. JUDICIAL EXCLUSIVITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Same-sex marriage affords a chance to move from the abstract to
the particular in assessing the impact of judicial review, and in particular
the consequences of judicial exclusivity in interpreting the Charter. It
demonstrates that judicial exclusivity in interpreting the Charter is not
only well-established as a constitutional norm, but that it has become an
important consideration in the political process. It also demonstrates, I
think, the way in which judicial exclusivity can have a debilitating effect
on the political process.
1. A Long-Developing Controversy
Same-sex marriage has been before Canadian courts for over a decade. During that period, successive governments have taken the position that the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples does not
violate the Charter, a position that has been maintained as the Court’s
approach to the equality right in section 15 of the Charter evolved.
Faced with decisions precluding different treatment of same-sex couples
in a variety of contexts, Parliament and the provincial legislatures
amended numerous laws. Significantly, however, Parliament stopped
short of amending the law to establish same-sex marriage. On the contrary, in 1999 Parliament expressly endorsed the traditional concept of
opposite-sex marriage.49
Litigation continued during this time, and precedents began to build
up in the lower courts. The Ontario Divisional Court held that the common law definition of marriage infringed the Charter, but suspended the
48

48

See Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations) (1993), 14
O.R. (3d) 658, [1993] O.J. No. 575 (Div. Ct.).
49
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 1.1.
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declaration for two years to allow Parliament to respond.50 Subsequently, a Quebec trial court reached the same conclusion, and also
suspended its declaration for two years.51 The British Columbia Court of
Appeal held that the definition of marriage violated the Charter and
suspended its declaration to coincide with the date the suspension in the
Ontario decision was set to expire.
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Canada52
brought things to a head. Not only did the Court hold that the definition
of marriage infringed the Charter, it reformulated the definition to mean
the “voluntary union for life of two persons,” and its order was made
effective immediately, thus pre-empting any legislative response.
The decision in Halpern came as no surprise; same-sex marriage
ceased to be a radical idea from the moment the first court held that the
law of marriage violated the Charter. Nevertheless, the remedial aspect
of Halpern came as a considerable surprise. Suspended declarations of
Charter infringements are common,53 and the Ontario Court of Appeal
was well aware that the issue was under political consideration at the
highest level. A committee of Parliament had conducted national consultations and was in the process of preparing a report for Parliament.54

50

Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 16.
Hendricks v. Quebec (Procureur général), [2002] J.Q. 3816 (Sup. Ct.). The B.C.
Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion of unconstitutionality as the Ontario Court, but
suspended its order to allow Parliament time to respond. See EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General) (2003), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2003] B.C.J. No. 994 (C.A.). Following the
federal government’s announcement that it would not be appealing the decision in Halpern,
the B.C.C.A. lifted the suspension order, and the Quebec Court of Appeal followed suit.
52
Supra, note 16 [hereinafter “Halpern”].
53
In Vann Niagara Ltd v. Oakville (Town) (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 1, [2002] O.J. No.
2323, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal held two relatively inconsequential municipal
bylaws regulating the use of billboard advertising to be unconstitutional on the basis that they
infringed the freedom of expression, but without discussion suspended its declaration for six
months. (The Court’s decision on one of the bylaws was overturned on appeal to the Supreme
Court, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 158, [2003] S.C.J. No. 71.) Bruce Ryder criticizes suspended declarations of unconstitutionality in “Suspending the Charter” (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 267.
54
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights had
been studying the possible recognition of same-sex unions since November 2002, and had
held hearings over a period of several months. Following the decision of the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Halpern, the Committee adopted a motion to support the Court’s decision. The
vote was 9-8, after two members of the Committee representing the government who opposed
same-sex marriage were replaced. See Clark, “Government steers vote on accepting same-sex
ruling” The Globe and Mail (13 June 2003).
51
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It is not too much to say that the Court’s remedial order was contemptuous of the democratic processes that were underway. Yet no
criticism was heard from the government on this account. The task of
defending the role of Parliament fell to the Opposition, which opposed
the Court’s decision and as a result had little credibility as Parliament’s
defender. For its part, the government announced that it intended to
legislate in accordance with the Court’s decision rather than appeal it to
the Supreme Court of Canada. First, however, it would be submitting a
reference to the Court, asking three questions ostensibly designed to
clarify the issues.
2. The Government’s Initial Response and Strategy
The government directed a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada on July 16, 2003, asking the following questions:
Is the annexed Proposal for an Act respecting certain aspects of legal
capacity for marriage for civil purposes within the exclusive
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada? If not, in what
particular or particulars, and to what extent?
If the answer to question 1 is yes, is section 1 of the proposal, which
extends capacity to marry to persons of the same sex, consistent with
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? If not, in what
particular or particulars, and to what extent?
Does the freedom of religion guaranteed by paragraph 2(a) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protect religious officials
from being compelled to perform a marriage between two persons of
the same sex that is contrary to their religious beliefs?

The answers the Court will give to these reference questions are obvious — specifically, yes, yes, and yes — and in normal circumstances
there would be no reason to seek the Court’s opinion on them prior to
legislating. These are not normal circumstances, however. An election
was pending, and same-sex marriage is politically divisive. There is
significant opposition to it within the government caucus; it is an issue
that separates the government and the Opposition; and it appears to
divide Canadians. In these circumstances, the reference serves more
than simply legal purposes. The government is using the reference procedure to pursue its political agenda.
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The first and third questions have not really been put into issue. The
federal government has authority over marriage and divorce under section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867,55 and there is no doubt that
this includes the question of capacity to marry.56 As for the freedom of
religious officials to choose which marriages to sanctify, this is surely
one of the least things that the guarantee of freedom of religion in section 2(a) of the Charter requires, and no legislative authorization is required in order to exercise that freedom.
The second question is simply disingenuous. There is no doubt that
Parliament is free to legislate to create same-sex marriage should it wish
to do so, and that it always has been. To ask the Court whether Parliament can do what it so obviously can is to feign caution where courage
is lacking. In terms of crass partisan advantage, the government is using
the Court to fend off political criticism and buy time. The reference
ensures that the controversy is removed from continued political scrutiny in the short run. Anyone attempting to raise the matter is sure to be
met with the refrain that it would be inappropriate to discuss the matter
while it is before the Court. The length of time the Court can be expected to take to hear and answer the reference questions is simply an
added bonus, given that it allowed the government to go to the polls
before the matter could return to Parliament.
3. Revising the Strategy
With the end of Jean Chrétien’s leadership and the beginning of
Paul Martin’s came a new Cabinet and a revised strategy on same-sex
marriage, albeit to the same political end. The new Minister of Justice,
Irwin Cotler, announced that the government remained committed to
55

(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
Justice Pitfield held that the law of the Constitution Act, 1867 bars same-sex marriages, and that constitutional amendment was required in order to change the concept of
marriage — this despite submissions from both the Attorney General for British Columbia
and the Attorney General for Canada that the opposite-sex requirement related to the capacity
to marry falls within Parliament’s jurisdiction to legislate under s. 91(26). See EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122 (B.C.S.C.). On appeal,
both Attorneys General agreed that the trial judge erred on this point. See EGALE Canada
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), supra, note 51, at para. 11 (C.A.). The British
Columbia Court of Appeal followed the Ontario Court of Appeal in holding that Pitfield J.
was incorrect.
56
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same-sex marriage. At the same time, however, the government was
expanding the pending reference to include a fourth question:
Is the opposite-sex requirement for marriage for civil purposes, as
established by the common law and set out for Quebec in s. 5 of the
Federal Law — Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, consistent with
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? If not, in what
particular or particulars and to what extent?

This is the very question that would have been answered had the
government appealed the decision in Halpern. Not only did it not do so,
however, it opposed those intervenors who sought standing to appeal the
decision, and was successful in doing so.57
The government should have appealed the decision in Halpern for
several reasons. First, where the constitutionality of federal law is concerned, it is almost invariably inappropriate for the Attorney General to
let a provincial court of appeal have the last word. A national solution is
required, and if the solution is to come from a court it should come from
the highest court.58 Second, the case raises an important point about
remedial discretion, and in particular the circumstances in which it is
appropriate to suspend a declaration of unconstitutionality in order to
allow a legislative response. This is a question that transcends the importance of same-sex marriage, and further guidance from the Supreme
Court would be helpful.
The fact that the law of equality had not changed — the Court in
Halpern was simply applying the test developed by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration)59
— is another reason that made an appeal in Halpern appropriate. If the
government was sincere in the position it advanced at trial and on appeal, it is difficult to see why it should not have persevered. Many cases
lost in the lower courts are won in the Supreme Court. It is possible,
however, that the government’s heart was never in the defence of the
57

2003 SCCA 337.
See Huscroft, “The Attorney-General and Charter Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator” (1995) 5 N.J.C.L. 125, at 161-62, arguing that “a decision that federal
legislation is unconstitutional should normally be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada,
in order to ensure the equal application of federal legislation across the provinces.” The same
applies, in my view, where the common law is concerned.
59
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12.
58
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law. We have to consider the possibility that the decision in Halpern
was to the government’s liking, despite the position the government
advanced. The government had to defend the law at first instance, but
the emphatic decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal might have galvanized support for same-sex marriage sufficiently to make the decision to
legislate politically palatable, if not positively virtuous: in conceding
defeat, the government purported to emphasize its respect for the Charter.
In any event, addition of the fourth question allowed the fundamental issue to be addressed by the Court — that is, whether the oppositesex requirement for marriage is inconsistent with the Charter. This gives
objectors the day in court denied them when the government elected not
to appeal. At the same time, it allows the government to argue against
the constitutionality of the law it has announced its intention to amend.
4. Selling the Strategy
The Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler, has sought to portray the government’s strategy on same-sex marriage as based in principle:
[T]here is a third important principle, and that is the importance of a
full and informed debate before the court, in Parliament and in
response to concerns of the public. It is to respect that third principle
that the Government is seeking the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Canada on a new question in the reference on civil marriage and the
legal recognition of same-sex unions.
In particular, the Government of Canada is seeking the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Canada on the question of whether the opposite-sex
requirement for marriage for civil purposes is consistent with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
We understand that many Canadians are struggling with this question.
And as a new administration, one of our key priorities is to address
what some have termed “a democratic deficit”.
While the Government’s position on the reference has not changed,
adding this question will allow for a more comprehensive opinion by
the Court, and for those groups and individuals who do not agree with
the Government’s approach to put their case to the Court.
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As you may know, the Supreme Court ruled last Friday that 18 groups
and individuals can intervene. So we are sure of a full range of views
before the Court.
In making this decision to add a new question, the Government was
guided by three principles - equality, religious freedom, and the
importance of a full and informed debate before the court, in
Parliament and in response to the concerns of Canadians on this
important social issue.
In summary, the Government continues to believe that the best way to
fully respect the two fundamental Charter rights involved here equality and freedom of religion - is to provide equal access to civil
marriage for same-sex couples seeking that degree of commitment as
other couples, while ensuring the protection of religious officials who
refuse to perform marriage ceremonies where it would be against their
religious beliefs.
The final decision on this question will be made by Parliament in the
spirit of open debate. But before that happens, we need clear advice
from the Supreme Court on the legal framework within which choices
must be made.60

Consider what is going on here. The government — at the time a
majority government, no less, with the power to amend the law on a
party vote should it choose to do so — postponed legislating in order to
ask the Supreme Court questions to which it knew the answers. Counsel
will solemnly attend the hearing, and argue for the answers that the
Minister of Justice will have advised Cabinet that the government is
sure to receive. Then, we are told, a “full and informed debate” will
occur, and Members of Parliament will determine what the law should
be. Of course this is preposterous, and the availability and political attractiveness of this sort of strategy is a strong argument against the existence of a reference procedure. Not only is the government’s strategy
disingenuous politically, but it undermines the legitimacy of Parliament
as a constitutional actor. It reinforces the idea of judicial exclusivity in
interpreting the Charter, and suggests that political action would be
precipitous in the absence of judicial direction.

60
Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler, Press Release, “Government
of Canada Reaffirms its Position on Supreme Court Reference” (Ottawa, January 28, 2004).
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The addition of the fourth question to the reference demonstrates the
problem in sharp relief. The fourth question asks whether the oppositesex requirement for marriage is consistent with the Charter. The first
thing to notice about this question is that it is irrelevant. If the Court
holds that the opposite-sex marriage requirement is inconsistent with the
Charter, that is simply a reason for the government to do what it has
committed to do, and could already have done without the expense and
delay the reference litigation will occasion. If, on the other hand, the
Court answers the fourth question by stating that the opposite-sex requirement does not infringe the Charter, the Government remains free to
change the law of marriage to include same-sex couples in any event.
The Charter is a floor, not a ceiling, for rights, and Parliament is free to
establish greater rights protection than the Charter requires. Again, the
Court’s decision is simply irrelevant. If the government believes in
same-sex marriage, then there is no excuse for not legislating immediately.
Is there room for meaningful debate in Parliament about same-sex
marriage following the Court’s decision? If the Court advises that the
opposite-sex requirement for marriage is inconsistent with the Charter,
those MPs who oppose same-sex marriage will in essence be left to
debate the Court rather than the government. Whether the Court speaks
unanimously or through a bare majority, those who disagree can only
prevail temporarily, and then only if they can convince Parliament to
invoke the notwithstanding clause, thereby staving off same-sex marriage for up to five years. The only way in which meaningful debate
could occur is if the Court were to advise that Halpern was wrongly
decided. Same-sex marriage would be seen as a political decision rather
than a legal requirement. Despite the Justice Minister’s fine words about
the importance of Parliament and the spirit of open debate, this is surely
the government’s nightmare scenario.
Fortunately for the government this will not occur. It is simply too
late in the day for the Court to decide that limitation of marriage to
opposite-sex couples does not infringe the Charter, even if it once might
have done so. The government’s management of the issue has, in effect,
precluded the possibility of any other outcome: hundreds of couples
have married since the decision in Halpern, and hundreds more will
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have done so by the time the Court answers the reference questions. A
new status quo has been established, and no one should suppose that the
Court will disturb it.61

V. CAN THE COURT DISCOURAGE JUDICIAL REVIEW?
It might be objected that my concerns about judicial review and the
role of the Court wrongly assume that the Court has a choice in the
matter when it comes to exercising its judicial review function. It is
often said, for example, that the Court cannot refuse to decide Charter
issues. Chief Justice McLachlin has frequently defended the Court
against charges of judicial activism on this basis:
The courts cannot say, “go away, we’re not interested in your
problem.” Nor can the courts say, the Parliamentarians debated this
and voted, and that’s the end of the matter. It is the constitutional
obligation of judges to hear a citizen’s complaint and to decide
whether it is valid or not.62

Kent Roach takes up the argument in The Supreme Court on Trial in
a chapter titled “The Myth of Judicial Activism.” He deprecates the
American practice of avoiding or limiting the extent of constitutional
adjudication, a practice Alexander Bickel called the “passive virtues.”63
There is a rich body of jurisprudence here that Roach does not consider.
In his view, avoidance is tantamount to “ducking constitutional issues,”
an act he equates with cowardice.64 He also equates it with the denial of

61
I put aside here a number of interesting questions that would arise in the event the
Court were to hold that Halpern was wrongly decided. It is one thing to advise that a case was
wrongly decided, but quite another to deal with rights that have been exercised in good faith
reliance on such a decision, especially given that the government elected not to appeal.
62
McLachlin, “Charter Myths” (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23, at 31.
63
Bickel, supra, note 12, at Ch. 4.
64
Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue?
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 208. I say this because at several points Roach describes
judicial decisions under the Charter as “courageous.” The Court’s decision in Burns and
Rafay (United States v. Burns), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8: precluding extradition to face the possibility of capital punishment) is described as a “courageous and bold
change of heart” (at 212), and a “courageous judgment” (at 213). I don’t know what it is that
makes a judgment courageous, but I wonder whether it is appropriate to describe any judicial
decision in these terms.
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rights: “The Court simply must decide constitutional issues, however
difficult or divisive they may be,” he argues, because “[d]ucking the
issue will only delay the inevitable and often constitute an implicit and
unjustified dismissal of the merits of the claim.”65
I think that this puts the case too highly. If the claim is that the Supreme Court is powerless to do anything other than decide any constitutional issue raised before it, then it is incorrect as a descriptive matter.
For the most part, the Court controls its docket: it has a discretion to
grant leave to appeal, and hears only those cases that it chooses to hear
— cases that in its view raise matters of public importance.66 Chief
Justice McLachlin’s point that “judges do not have agendas,” but simply
“take the laws and the cases as they find them, and apply their interpretative skills to them as the constitution requires,”67 may be true as far as
the lower courts are concerned, but not the Supreme Court of Canada. In
deciding which cases it will hear the Supreme Court sets the constitutional agenda and, having done so, reserves the right to determine
whether and how thoroughly it will deal with the issues the parties want
to litigate. The Court has discretion as to how it chooses to deal with
even those cases it must accept. The exercise of the Court’s discretion in
dealing with reference questions is a prominent example here. Some of
the most famous reference cases are those in which the Court has exercised its discretion to answer questions not raised in a reference.68 The
Court has also exercised its discretion not to answer matters raised in a
reference.69
The larger problem with the argument that the Court must decide
Charter cases is the assumption that underlies it. The assumption is that

65

Id., at 210.
The Court must hear criminal law appeals as of right in some cases, and must accept
reference questions. In general, however, the Court decides which cases it will hear based on
its opinion that the question raised is a matter of public importance such that it ought to be
decided by the Court: Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40(1).
67
Chief Justice McLachlin, address to The Canadian Club of Toronto, Tuesday, June
17, 2003.
68
Prominent here are Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution (sub nom.
Reference re Questions concerning Amendment of Constitution of Canada as set out in O.C.
1020/80), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”], and Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61.
69
Hogg, supra, note 30, at Ch. 8.6(d). Hogg advocates that the Court exercise its discretion not to answer a reference question more often.
66
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judicial decisions are necessary because the Charter has no meaning in
the absence of judicial explication. The assumption is usually implicit
but it is sometimes explicit, as for example when the Court justifies
extensive obiter dicta on the basis that the parties need to know the
law.70 More problematically, it is also justified on the basis that politicians have abdicated their responsibilities.
Recall the remarks of Lamer C.J. quoted earlier:
Thank God we’re here. It’s not for me to criticize legislators but if
they choose not to legislate, that’s their doing. If they prefer to leave it
up to the court that’s their choice. But a problem is not going to go
away because legislators aren’t dealing with it. People say we’re
activist, but we’re doing our job.71

The short answer to the Chief Justice is that divine providence has less
to do with the scope of constitutional judicial review than the will of the
Court. Legislators may well attempt to abdicate their responsibilities and
leave matters to the Court, but the Court is a major contributor to the
problem. In the Charter era the Court’s decisions alter the political landscape, and not only in respect of particular issues. They create structural
incentives and disincentives to political action, and it ill-becomes the
Court to affect surprise at any of this, or to express disapproval of timid
legislatures. By being helpful or more grandly purporting to “do its
duty” in Charter cases, the Court diminishes not only the importance of
political resolution of rights questions but the likelihood that it will
occur.

70

Sometimes this is expressed as a matter of fairness to the parties: having argued a
matter, they deserve to have the Court answer it.
71
Chief Justice Lamer, quoted in Tibbetts, supra, note 7. Counsel have no compunction about urging courts to resolve questions rather than leaving them to legislatures. Counsel
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VI. CONCLUSION
Historian Michael Bliss has expressed concern that the debate over
same-sex marriage may cause a political backlash, and ultimately a
confrontation between Parliament and the Court. According to Bliss,
[p]oliticians simply cannot offer easy leadership on divisive social
issues, but rather have to follow the tide of opinion, brokering
competing positions and waiting for common denominators to
develop. Certain problems involving conflicting claims to rights and
privileges within society really ought to be left to the courts to sort out.
I think the difficult question of the definition of marriage is one such
problem.72

It does not occur to Bliss that the problems he seeks to avoid — a political backlash and a confrontation between Parliament and the Court —
have been caused by the solution he advocates. Nor does it occur to him
that removing issues from democratic deliberation may exacerbate those
problems. One of the important lessons of American constitutional law
is that the judiciary has less ability to resolve pressing social issues than
is commonly supposed. It may succeed from time to time, where it is
able to identify and reinforce a matter of societal consensus, or perhaps
an emerging area of consensus, but for every Brown v. Board of Education73 there is likely to be a Roe v. Wade,74 a cautionary tale about the
exercise of judicial power. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to constitutionalize the law of abortion fanned the flames of that controversy,
and put the Court at the centre of a political debate that continues over
thirty years later.
If Bliss’s solution is problematic, the larger concern is that he supposes there is a problem that needs to be addressed at all. The controversy that accompanies the exercise of deliberative democracy is not
something to be regretted, and avoided if possible. It is an inherent part
of the process we need to face and resolve in order to act as a selfgoverning democratic polity. Democracy is not for the faint-hearted, and
the Court does Canadians no favours when it promotes reliance upon
judicial review as a means of resolving difficult societal problems. The
72
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risk is that it will undermine not only our capacity but our will for political resolution.
This risk is inherent in any system of judicial review. The American
scholar James Bradley Thayer warned about the impact of judicial review on the democratic processes over a century ago:
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function
[judicial review], now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the
political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility. It is no light thing to do that.75

Thayer does not receive much attention these days, and virtually
none in Canada. But the warning he sounded then is worth heeding now.
In the second generation under the Charter, the challenge for the Supreme Court lies in ensuring that there is more to democratic constitutionalism than simply judicial review. Repudiating the government’s
political strategy in the same-sex marriage reference would be a good
start.
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